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Social Disclosure 
Barnali Choudhury 
Globally, there is a growing interest in using disclosure rules in corporate 
and securities law to achieve social policy goals. The blending of corporate law 
with social issues is a transformation of disclosure obligations, which have 
traditionally focused on reducing information asymmetries and instilling 
confidence in the market. At the same time, the amalgamation of disclosure 
requirements with social goals signals a convergence of private and public 
goals. Private corporations are now being asked to take on a role in promoting 
social policies—a role traditionally allocated to governments. 
Against this background, this article examines the utility of disclosure rules 
to promote social policies. The article finds that the role for public issues in the 
private area of corporate and securities law is limited, but concludes—from a 
comparative perspective—that disclosure rules which are narrow in scope and 
boast a high degree of specificity can be effective supplementary devices for 
curing corporate ills. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the UK government determined that there was an insufficient number 
of women on corporate boards, it did not mandate that corporations increase the 
number of women in management. Instead, it required that they disclose the 
number of women holding managerial positions within firms.1 Similarly, when 
the Indian government became concerned about the country’s energy usage, it 
too focused on disclosure, requiring corporations to report on corporate efforts 
to conserve energy.2 More recently, in an effort to curtail the violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),3 Congress directed the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to mandate corporate disclosure when using conflict 
minerals. 
These practices are indicative of a growing trend by governments to use 
corporate and securities disclosure rules to achieve social aims. The blending of 
corporate law with social policy is a transformation of disclosure obligations, 
which have traditionally focused on reducing information asymmetries between 
investors and corporations and instilling confidence in the market.4 Instead, 
disclosure obligations are now gradually being refocused on a third function: 
improving corporate accountability.5 As Brandeis has noted about the utility of 
disclosure to address these issues: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy 
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”6 
The increasing reliance on disclosure requirements in corporate and securities 
laws suggests that there remain few ills that cannot be cured through disclosure. 
At the same time, the amalgamation of disclosure requirements with social 
goals tends to signal a convergence of private and public goals in the corporate 
sphere. Corporations—traditionally viewed as private entities—are increasingly 
being asked to take on a role in promoting social policies, a role traditionally 
allocated to governments. 
Against this background, this article takes a step back to question whether 
disclosure requirements in corporate and securities laws should be used as tools 
 
1.  For an overview of UK government initiatives to increase the number of women on boards, see 
Barnali Choudhury, New Rationales for Women on Boards, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 511, 515 (2014). 
2.  Companies (Disclosure of Particulars in the Report of Board of Directors) Rules, 1988 (India), 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/rules/CDoPitRoBoDR1988.pdf.  
3.  Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Proposed Rule to 
Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act – the “Conflict Minerals” Provision (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370542577745. 
4.  GAËTANE SCHAEKEN WILLEMAERS, THE EU ISSUER-DISCLOSURE REGIME: OBJECTIVES AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 21 (2011); see also LONDON STOCK EXCH., ADMISSION AND DISCLOSURE 
STANDARDS 15 (2013), http://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/documents/admission-and-
disclosure-standards.pdf (discussing disclosure standards in the UK). 
5.  DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE FUTURE OF NARRATIVE REPORTING – A 
CONSULTATION5(2010), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31440/10-1057-future-
narrative-reporting-consultation.pdf [hereinafter BIS]. 
6.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 65 (2009). 
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by governments to promote social policies. In doing so, it asks whether corporate 
law, traditionally thought of as a predominantly private law tool, should be used 
to achieve public aims. Moreover, even if corporate law is the correct vehicle for 
promoting these policies, it questions the utility of these types of disclosure 
obligations since such disclosures may make only marginal improvements to the 
social aims they seek to promote, often at significant cost. 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by examining the concept 
of financial disclosure and reviews its origins and purpose. It then takes a 
comparative look at the prevalence of financial and other disclosure requirements 
aimed at social goals around the globe. Part II explores whether inserting social 
aims into financial disclosure requirements is justifiable given the private nature 
of corporations and the public nature of the goals. Finding support in both 
international and corporate law, it then examines the impact of these disclosure 
obligations on shareholders, who are thought to be the primary beneficiaries of 
these obligations. Finally, Part III discusses how best to regulate social disclosure 
obligations in light of the findings in the earlier Parts. Examining social 
disclosure obligations through a meta-regulatory lens and drawing from 
comparative perspectives, the article discusses the limitations of the most 
common regulatory approaches and suggests alternative regulatory proposals. 
I.  DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure is the legal requirement for corporations to provide certain 
prescribed information. Today, disclosure requirements for corporations can be 
found in a broad range of statutes and rules, although the focus of this article is 
on mandatory disclosure requirements in corporate and securities laws. In the 
United States, mandatory financial and related disclosure requirements are found 
primarily in Regulation S-K promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC),7 while in other countries they are found predominantly in 
corporate law.8 
A. Why Disclose? 
The primary purpose for mandatory disclosure is the reduction of 
information asymmetries that can lead to market failures.9 By requiring 
corporations to disclose relevant information about their businesses, investors 
 
7.       17 C.F.R. § 229 (2015). 
8.  See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46, Parts 15 and 16 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf; Companies (Disclosure of 
Particulars in the Report of Board of Directors) Rules, 1988 (India) 
http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/actsbills/rules/CDoPitRoBoDR1988.pdf. 
9.  For an extensive discussion on the reasons justifying mandatory disclosure, see CHARLOTTE 
VILLIERS, CORPORATE REPORTING AND COMPANY LAW 16–22 (2012); DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY 
LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS, WEB CHAPTER A: DISCLOSURE, ACCOUNTING, AND AUDIT 13-
21 (2d ed. 2013). 
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receive sufficient information to enable them to correctly price a security.10 To 
achieve this aim, the information must be of a quality that would otherwise be 
inaccessible by investors, either because of the costs in locating this information 
or because they lack the means to do so.11 
Without mandatory disclosure, information is thought to be under-
produced;12 that is, result in a market failure of certain disclosures.13 Corporate 
managers have the best access to information, but they may be disinclined from 
producing it in certain scenarios, such as when they can benefit from information 
asymmetries with shareholders.14 Mandatory disclosure therefore drives efforts 
by corporate managers to ferret out material information that “improve[s] the 
allocative efficiency of the capital market.”15 Thus, since disclosure improves 
the efficiency of the market and an efficient market is in society’s intereststhe 
benefits of disclosure extend beyond corporations and issuers to encapsulate 
society.16 
While reducing information asymmetries—the primary justification for 
mandatory disclosure—is almost universally recognized, a less common, but 
increasingly important role for mandatory disclosure is in relation to corporate 
accountability and governance. Indeed, Fox has argued that improving corporate 
governance—the means by which corporate managers make decisions—is “the 
most persuasive justification” for imposing disclosure obligations on 
corporations.17 Others have agreed with Fox’s sentiments, recognizing disclosure 
 
10.  IRIS H.-Y. CHIU, REGULATORY CONVERGENCE IN EU SECURITIES REGULATION 14-15 (2008); 
LONDON STOCK EXCH., supra note 4, at 15; Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role 
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 737-40 (2006).  
11.  CHIU, supra note 10, at 14-15; Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 375-76 (2013). 
12.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 
70 VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 11, at 375. 
13.  CHIU, supra note 10, at 15. 
14.  Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 11, at 375-76. 
15.  Coffee, supra note 12, at 722; see also Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1415 (1999) (“[T]he 
primary function of disclosure is promotion of efficiency.”); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency 
and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1996) 
(praising U.S. disclosure requirements as contributing to the efficiency of U.S. financial markets).  
16.  Coffee, supra note 12, at 722 (arguing that an efficient capital market improves “the 
productiveness of the economy”); GUIDO FERRARINI, EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE 
INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 69 (1998) (arguing there is a public interest in the 
functioning of the capital market as it is crucial to the economic development of the country). 
17.  Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
113, 114 (2000); see also Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 1335 (noting that U.S. disclosure obligations have 
contributed to effective corporate governance); Elliot J. Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 
34 BUS. LAW. 575, 576-77 (1979) (“Disclosure . . . is the oil that lubricates the machinery of the 
governance system.”). 
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as a key safeguard of corporate governance18 and necessary to focus corporations 
“on the issues which matter to their long term success.”19 
Eminent securities law historian Louis Loss has well summed up the 
behavioral effects of disclosure obligations on corporate managers: “People who 
are forced to undress in public will presumably pay some attention to their 
figures.”20 In other words, disclosure obligations can force corporate managers 
to better manage the areas of corporate life which they will later be forced to 
reveal. Indeed, encouraging desired corporate behavior is a “by-product of the 
framework for better disclosures.”21 Disclosure is thus used as a tactic to force 
corporate managers “to confront disagreeable realities in detail and early on”22 
and as a review of the corporation’s stewardship. 
B. Social Disclosure 
While adhering to disclosure obligations requires firms to report both 
financial and non-financial data,23 this article focuses on the disclosure 
obligations of non-financial data, particularly disclosure of information oriented 
towards social issues. These non-financial disclosure requirements, including 
human rights and environmental disclosures, are herein termed “social 
disclosure.” 
1. The Rising Interest in Social Disclosure 
There has been a relatively recent uptake in the number of countries choosing 
to impose social disclosure obligations on corporations. From 2006 to 2013, the 
number of countries prescribing social disclosure rules have more than doubled, 
and the number of worldwide mandatory social disclosure requirements have 
 
18.  As early as the Cadbury Report, the UK government has envisaged disclosure as a key safeguard 
of corporate governance. See THE COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶ 7.2 (1992), 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf. 
19.  BIS, supra note 5, at 5.  
20.  LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 33 (2d ed. 1988). 
21.  FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE SHARMAN INQUIRY – GOING CONCERN AND LIQUIDITY RISKS: 
LESSONS FOR COMPANIES AND AUDITORS – FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL OF 
INQUIRY ¶ 47 (2012), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/591a5e2a-35d7-4470-a46c-
30c0d8ca2a14/Sharman-Inquiry-Final-Report.aspx; see also VILLIERS, supra note 9, at 22 (“The 
existence of such disclosure requirements might of itself encourage higher standards of behaviour by the 
company directors.”). 
22.  Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 1342-44. 
23.  For some of the financial and non-financial data that companies listing on the London Stock 
Exchange are required to disclose, see LONDON STOCK EXCH,, MAIN MARKET – KEY CONTINUING 
OBLIGATIONS (2010), http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-
market/documents/brochures/main-market-continuing-obligations.pdf. For companies that do not trade on 
the LSE, disclosure obligations are found in Parts 15 and 16 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK). 
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more than tripled.24 In a survey of 45 countries, a report found that there were 
now 180 standards and laws prescribing social disclosure, 72 percent of which 
were mandatory.25 
The recent interest in social disclosure obligations arises, in part, from a 
prolonged interest in improving overall corporate transparency.26 Social 
disclosure obligations can be used to provide information on a corporation’s 
relationship to social policy issues to stakeholders and to society at large. 
Stakeholders can then use the disclosed information to determine to determine 
on what basis, or whether at all, they will transact with a corporation. For 
instance, employees can use a corporation’s disclosed social information as part 
of a collective bargaining strategy.27 Similarly, social disclosure can facilitate 
“the efficient allocation of resources by enabling individuals to more fully satisfy 
their preferences” when interacting with the corporation, such as when a 
customer buys a corporation’s product or when an individual accepts 
employment.28 
More broadly, increased corporate transparency on social issues may enable 
society to hold corporations accountable.29 Society often has certain expectations 
of corporations beyond economic goals, yet they may not be able to assess 
whether corporations are meeting these expectations without further information 
which is likely only available from the corporations themselves.30 Social 
disclosure can therefore be used as an instrument for public scrutiny of corporate 
actions and as a guarantor for public trust in corporations.31 
2. Social Disclosure Obligations Across the Globe 
Mandatory social disclosure obligations across the world are experiencing 
phenomenal growth. Countries from almost every region of the world now 
engage in some form of reporting. This section discusses social disclosure 
 
24.  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., CARROTS AND STICKS: SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING POLICIES WORLDWIDE – TODAY’S BEST PRACTICE, TOMORROW’S TRENDS 9 (2013), 
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Carrots-and-Sticks.pdf.  
25.  Id. at 8-9. 
26.  VILLIERS, supra note 9, at 31; KERSHAW, supra note 9, at 4-5. 
27.  VILLIERS, supra note 9, at 31. 
28.  KERSHAW, supra note 9, at 4. 
29.  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 24, at 19. 
30.  See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups, at 2, COM (2013) 207 final (Apr. 16, 2013) 
(proposal requiring certain large companies to disclose relevant non-financial information) (“[N]on-
financial information is used by civil society organisations and local communities to assess the impact and 
risks related to the operations of a company.”). 
31.  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Renewed EU Strategy 2011–14 
for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 11, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 2011); UNITED NATIONS 
ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 24, at 15.  
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requirements across Europe (France, Denmark, and the UK), Asia (India, China), 
and the United States. 
a. Europe 
European countries lead the way in social disclosure requirements,32 in part 
because of European Union legislation which requires corporations to disclose 
environmental and employee matters.33 Further, the European Parliament 
recently adopted a directive requiring large corporations to disclose information 
relating to social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anti-
corruption and bribery matters, and board diversity.34 
Several EU member states have, however, adopted a higher standard for 
social disclosure than that required by EU legislation. France, for instance, 
requires corporations to disclose information on their environmental and social 
performance, which is then subject to third party verification.35 Larger 
corporations also have to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions, at a minimum, 
on a tri-annual basis.36 Similarly, in Denmark, corporations must disclose their 
corporate social responsibilities (CSR) polices, discuss how they translate their 
policies into action, and evaluate what they have achieved through their CSR 
initiatives.37 In addition, since 2013, Danish corporations must expressly discuss 
their human rights and climate impact reduction actions, regardless of whether 
they are already included in their CSR policies.38 Still further, Danish law 
requires corporations to disclose their progress in increasing the number of 
women managing Danish corporations and any policies they have enacted to 
achieve this goal.39 
 
32.  See generally GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING POLICY INITIATIVES 
IN EUROPE, http://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Sustainability-Reporting-Policy-Initiatives-
in-Europe.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (summarizing European nation specific obligations for non-
financial disclosure); Tineke Lambooy & Nicole van Vliet, Transparency on Corporate Social 
Responsibility in Annual Reports, 5 EUR. COMPANY L. 127 (2008) (discussing implementation of the 
Modernization Directive in EU Member States and trends in CSR transparency in annual reports). 
33.  E.g., Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, art. 46(b), 2003 O.J. (L 178) 16 (EC). 
34.  Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the 
Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of 
Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19.  
35.  Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement [Law 2010-
788 of July 12, 2010 Bearing on National Engagement for the Environment] as amended by Décret 2012-
557 du 24 avril 2012 relatif aux obligations de transparence des entreprises en matière sociale et 
environnementale [Decree 2012-557 of April 24, 2012 Concerning Corporate Transparency Requirements 
Relating to Social and Environmental Matters], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 26, 2012, p. 7439. 
36.  Id. at art. 75. 
37.  Danish Financial Statements Act 2008, § 99a (2008) (Den.), 
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=158560. 
38.  Act Amending the Danish Financial Statements Act (2012) (Den.), http://csrgov.dk/legislation. 
39.  Danish Financial Statements Act 2013, § 99b (Den.), 
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/r0710.aspx?id=158560. 
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In the UK, large corporations are required to disclose environmental and 
employee matters as part of their annual business review.40 In addition to these 
requirements, listed corporations are required to disclose information about the 
impact of the corporation’s business on the environment, employees, and social 
and community issues, as well as policies on these matters and an evaluation of 
the effectiveness of those policies.41 More recently, the UK government revised 
its disclosure obligations and introduced a new requirement obliging 
corporations to produce a strategic report containing certain disclosures.42 Large 
corporations must still disclose information on environmental and employee 
matters,43 but listed corporations must disclose information on environmental, 
employee, and social and community matters as well as, for the first time, 
information on human rights issues.44 Moreover, as part of the government’s 
efforts to increase the number of women on boards, listed corporations are 
additionally required to disclose the number of female directors, senior 
managers, and employees of the corporation,45 as well as disclose their 
greenhouse gas emissions if it is practical to obtain that information.46 
b. Asia 
Asia is another region experiencing tremendous growth in social disclosure 
obligations, and India is at its forefront. In 2012, the Indian Parliament 
introduced new requirements that mandate that corporations form CSR 
committees comprised of directors who are required to formulate CSR policies 
that outline the activities the corporate will undertake in this respect.47 
Corporations are required to spend at least two percent of their average net profits 
from the preceding three years on CSR activities.48 In connection with these 
requirements, corporations must disclose the composition of the CSR 
Committees and CSR activities. Where a corporation fails to spend the minimum 
prescribed amount on CSR activities, the corporation must provide an 
explanation for their failure to do so.49 Listed corporations are also required to 
 
40.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 417 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
41.  Id. § 417(5). 
42.  The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, SI 
2013/1970, § 414A (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/pdfs/uksi_20131970_en.pdf. 
The strategic report replaces the earlier required business review. 
43.  Id. § 414C(4)(b). 
44.  Id. § 414C(7)(b).  
45.  See id. § 414C(8). 
46.  Id. §§ 15-20. 
47.  The Companies Bill, 2012, No. 121-C, 2012, § 135 (India). 
48.  Id. § 135(5). 
49.  Id. § 135(2), (4)(a), (5). 
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disclose environmental and social measures taken by the business as part of their 
business responsibility reports.50 
Chinese listed corporations are similarly required to disclose prescribed 
environmental information under the country’s Green Securities Policy.51 
Corporations in energy-intensive industries must even undergo an environmental 
assessment before they are permitted to initiate an initial public offering.52 
Conversely, state-owned Chinese corporations are only strongly encouraged to 
disclose CSR activities, but as this recommendation has been issued by China’s 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission—a highly 
influential presence over the business community in China—it holds important 
influence over corporate reporting in China.53 Chinese stock exchange rules 
provide further social disclosure obligations. The Shanghai Stock Exchange, for 
instance, encourages listed corporations to disclose CSR practices while the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange requires corporations to establish a social 
responsibility mechanism and to disclose social responsibility matters.54 
c. United States 
In the United States, the SEC holds primary responsibility for the corporate 
disclosure of social obligations, although there remain significant social 
disclosure obligations under non-corporate or securities law-related legislation.55 
Under SEC rules, corporations must, among other requirements, disclose climate 
 
50.  For an overview of Business Responsibility reports in India, see SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, 
CIRCULAR – BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY REPORTS (2012), 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/cms/sebi_data/attachdocs/1344915990072.pdf. 
51.  Disanxiang huanjing jingji zhengce lvse zhengquan zhidao yijian chutai 2008nian jiang jianli 
shangshi qiye huanjing xinxi tongbao zhidu (第三项环境经济政策绿色证券指导意见出台 2008年将
建立上市企业环境信息通报制度) [The Third Environmental Economic Policy Guide Issued and 
Environmental Information Reporting System to be Built in 2008] (promulgated by the St. Envtl Prot. 
Agency, Feb. 25, 2008, effective Feb. 25 2008), 
http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/qt/200910/t20091023_180135.htm (China). For an overview of the 
Green Securities Policy, see Hua Wang & David Bernell, Environmental Disclosure in China: An 
Examination of the Green Securities Policy, 22 J. ENV’T & DEV. 339, 343-46 (2013), and ADINA 
MATISOFF & MICHELLE CHAN, THE GREEN EVOLUTION – ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND PRACTICE IN 
CHINA’S BANKING SECTOR 12-13 (2008), 
http://www.banktrack.org/manage/ems_files/download/the_green_evolution_environmental_ 
policies_and_practice_in_the_chinese_banking_sector/green_evolution_2008_foe_final.pdf. 
52.  Wang & Bernell, supra note 51, at 343; MATISOFF & CHAN, supra note 51, at 12. 
53.  STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION & ADMIN. COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL (SASAC), 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, GUIDELINES TO THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES DIRECTLY UNDER 
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ON FULFILLING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (2011), 
http://en.sasac.gov.cn/n1408035/c1477196/content.html; Brian Ho, CSR as “No. 1” Issue for State-owned 
Enterprises in China, 4 CSA ASIA WKLY. 1, 1-2 (2008).  
54.  See Michael A. Levine, China’s CSR Expectations Mature, 35 CHINA BUS. REV. 50, 51-52 
(2008); Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies (promulgated 
by the Shenzen Stock Exch., Sept. 25, 2006, effective Sept. 01, 2010), CLI.6.88455(EN) (Lawinfochina), 
art. 35-36. 
55.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2015) (requiring the filing of certain information about employees); 
40 C.F.R. § 90 (2015) (requiring information on greenhouse gas emissions). 
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change-related matters.56 Accordingly, corporations must disclose the material 
effects of compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws, pending 
environmental litigation, business risks and opportunities that arise from 
legislation or regulation related to climate change or other technical and scientific 
developments, and the physical impacts of climate change on operations and 
results.57 
SEC rules further require corporations to disclose how corporations consider 
diversity in identifying nominees for directorships.58 For example, corporations 
must disclose whether they have a diversity policy in appointing directors, and if 
so, describe how the policy is implemented and how its effectiveness is 
assessed.59 
More recently, in the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,60 the SEC introduced two new rules relating 
to social disclosure. The first was directed at corporations that use conflict 
minerals in the function or production of a manufactured product.61 The purpose 
of this rule was three-fold: to help end the human rights abuses in the DRC, to 
promote peace and security, and “to bring greater public awareness of the source 
of issuers’ conflict minerals and to promote the exercise of due diligence on 
conflict mineral supply chains.”62 
Additionally, corporations using conflict minerals are required to conduct an 
inquiry to determine whether any of the minerals originated in the DRC or 
bordering countries and to disclose the details of this process. If the corporation 
determines that the minerals originated in a conflict country, they must file a 
report detailing the measures taken to exercise due diligence on the source and 
chain of custody of those conflict minerals; measures which must conform to a 
nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework and be 
approved by an independent third-party audit.63 
The second rule introduced under the Dodd-Frank Act was directed at 
resource extraction corporations and required the disclosure of any payments 
made by the corporation, or its subsidiaries to governments for the commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.64 The rule’s purpose was to increase 
 
56.  Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 
(Feb. 8, 2010). 
57.  Id. at 6293-97 
58.  17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2015). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
61.  Id. § 1502 (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1). 
62.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56275 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
240, 249b). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249). 
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the transparency of payments made in this area and “to help empower citizens 
of . . . resource-rich countries to hold their governments accountable for the 
wealth generated by those resources.”65 
Both the conflict minerals rule and the resource extraction payment rule were 
highly contested by corporations and the relevant industries. In October 2012, 
both rules were challenged in separate lawsuits by several corporations and 
industry groups.66 In July 2013, the U.S. District Court of the District of 
Columbia vacated the resource extraction payment rule.67 The court found the 
wording of the regulation did not mandate public disclosure of the requested 
information.68 Instead, the court suggested that the SEC had discretion to allow 
corporations to disclose the payment information to them confidentially. In turn, 
the SEC could then make public a compilation of some of that information.69 The 
court further found that the SEC’s failure to make exemptions to the rule for 
countries that prohibit payment disclosure was arbitrary and capricious.70 Having 
decided not to appeal the court’s decision, the SEC recently proposed a revised 
resource extraction payments rule.71 
Similarly, in April 2014, the U.S. District Court of Appeals ruled that part of 
the conflict minerals rule is unconstitutional.72 The court found that the rule’s 
requirement that an issuer describe its products as “conflict free” violated 
corporations’ right to free speech, as the label conveyed corporations’ moral 
responsibility for the war in the DRC even if it disagreed with that assessment of 
its responsibility. While the ruling means that corporations do not have to 
disclose whether their products are conflict free, the remainder of the rule’s 
disclosure requirements remain in place.73 
 
65.  Id. at 56366. 
66.  The resource extraction payment rule was challenged in two lawsuits: Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 
SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013), and Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
The conflicts mineral rule was challenged in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
overruled on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.D.C. 2014).  
67.  Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 25. The second case was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Am. Petroleum Inst., 714 F.3d at 1331. 
68.  Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 13-16. 
69.  Id. at 9. 
70.  Id. at 20-23. 
71.  Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Won’t Appeal Ruling vs Disclosing Payments Abroad, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 
2013, 6:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-resource-extraction-idUSBRE9820Z820130903; 
SEC Proposes Rules for Resource Extraction Issuers Under Dodd-Frank Act, SEC (Dec. 11, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-277.html. 
72.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
73.  Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals Decision on the Conflict 
Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 29, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994. 
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II.  JUSTIFYING SOCIAL DISCLOSURE 
In some ways, governments’ increasing reliance on corporate and securities 
laws to promote social policy goals is surprising. Corporate law is traditionally 
seen as a tool of private law,74 while issues of human rights and other “social 
issues” are traditionally viewed as public issues. The public/private divide 
between corporate law and social rights is underscored by their respective 
governance: while corporate managers, such as boards of directors, are mainly 
responsible for the governance of corporate matters, governments assume 
primary responsibility for overseeing the protection of human rights and other 
social issues. Thus, using corporate and securities laws to promote social issues 
results in a predominantly private tool being used to foster essentially public 
goals. 
Nevertheless, the divide between corporate and social issues becomes less 
pronounced if social disclosure requirements further the interests of the 
shareholders, since shareholders are presumed to be the primary beneficiaries of 
corporate law.75 Yet it is unclear whether social disclosure rules benefit or harm 
shareholder interests. 
A. Shareholders and Social Disclosure Requirements: Help or Hindrance? 
On one hand, many social disclosure requirements are primarily justified on 
the basis that they protect shareholder interests. For instance, corporate reporting 
obligations are designed to inform shareholders about how corporate managers 
have furthered the interests of the corporation for their benefit.76 Similarly, 
securities laws require corporations to disclose information to help investors 
make investment decisions.77 
Indeed, social disclosure obligations can act to protect shareholders’ interests 
through risk identification and management, as well as through shareholder 
engagement.  As the European Parliament observed, social disclosure obligations 
provide information on matters that are likely “to bring about the materialisation 
 
74.  See MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE 177-226 
(2013). 
75.  Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
439 (2001) (“Corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); D. 
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998) (“Corporate directors 
have a fiduciary duty to make decisions that are in the best interests of shareholders.”). 
76.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 417(2) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
77.  See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY RULES DTR 1.3.3 
(2015), https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR.pdf; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 
MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE (DISCLOSURE RULES) INSTRUMENT 2005 R 2.2.4 (2005), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/transposition/uk/d13.2-uk.pdf; TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444-49 (1976). 
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of principal risks.”78 Moreover, by requiring corporate managers to disclose 
information about potentially harmful events, shareholders can more accurately 
price stocks by taking into account the risks their investment faces.79 At the same 
time, by having to gather information about particular risks, corporate managers 
can ex ante identify potential problems the business faces and work to avoid the 
commission of these events.80 This can benefit shareholders when the costs of 
correcting a problem are greater than the costs of risk minimization or 
prevention.81 
In recent years, the issue of risk identification in relation to social policy 
issues has gained urgency. This is because a failure to manage social policy 
issues relating to the business may result in a host of risks to the corporation, 
including community disruptions or protests of projects leading to project delays, 
lawsuits by stakeholders aimed at the corporation, and reputational damage.82 
One study even found that a firm’s environmental performance can play a role 
in its risk of bankruptcy.83 Thus, risk minimization or management prompted by 
social disclosure obligations may protect shareholders’ interests—directly or 
indirectly. 
In addition to helping identify risks, social disclosure obligations better 
enable shareholders to engage with corporations to improve corporations’ 
performance on social issues.84 The United Nations’ Principles for Responsible 
Investment report found that lack of environmental and social data is the “key 
barrier” to investors engagement with corporations’ social policy issues.85 
Providing information on social policy issues therefore gives investors 
information which can be used to orient the corporation in a desired direction. 
 
78.  Directive 2014/95/EU of The European Parliament and of the Council Of 22 October 2014 
Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by 
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) ¶ 8. 
79.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56350 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
240, 249b) (noting that social disclosure obligations “protect[] investors by requiring disclosure of 
information that may be material to their understanding of the risks of investing in an issuer or its supply 
chain,” which will help them price the company’s securities).  
80.  Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK 
ANALYSIS 155, 165 (1998). 
81.  See Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 463 (2011); HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLES: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 92 (2006). The costs which 
emanate out of the commission of a problem include reputational costs, project delays and disruptions 
costs, and costs arising from successful lawsuits emanating out of the misconduct. 
82.  AMY K. LEHR & GARE A. SMITH, IMPLEMENTING A CORPORATE FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED 
CONSENT POLICY: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 21 (2010) (ebook); Paul Kapelus, Mining, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the “Community”: The Case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and the 
Mbonambi, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 285 (2002). 
83.  Thomas E. Schneider, Is Environmental Performance a Determinant of Bond Pricing? Evidence 
from the U.S. Pulp and Paper and Chemical Industries, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1537, 1538 (2011) 
(finding a firm’s high environmental risk to be a “significant component of bankruptcy risk”). 
84.  See UNEP FIN, INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT – REPORT ON PROGRESS 
2009 (2009), http://www.unpri.org/wp-content/uploads/PRIReportonProgress09.pdf. 
85.  Id. at 34. 
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On the other hand, there is also a growing concern that social disclosure 
obligations may actually be impeding shareholders’ interests through imposing 
heavy compliance costs on corporations and inundating shareholders with 
information. As the SEC has found, a corporation’s shareholders will bear the 
cost of social disclosure compliance, potentially leading to the diversion of 
capital away from other productive opportunities and resulting in a loss of 
allocative efficiency.86 This potential burden on shareholders is noteworthy as 
disclosing information can be expensive, sometimes even “costing more than it 
is worth.”87 
For instance, the new conflict mineral rule has been estimated by the SEC to 
result in initial compliance costs of between $3 and $4 billion and ongoing 
compliance costs of between $207 and $609 million.88 Similarly, the SEC’s 
resource extraction payment rule is expected to result in initial compliance costs 
of $1 billion and ongoing compliance costs of between $200 and $400 million.89 
Even if costs to shareholders for compliance with social disclosure 
obligations are proportionate, it is questionable whether providing more 
information to investors is effective. As commentators have observed, 
individuals, including shareholders, have a limited ability to process 
information.90 Because of this limitation, providing information is always subject 
to the risk of overburdening individuals, resulting in “information overload.”91 
In these instances, providing large amounts of information is akin to not 
providing any information at all.92 
Without a doubt, shareholders are provided with considerable amounts of 
information. A recent study found that the average corporation’s annual report 
in the UK has more than doubled since 1996 and today stands at over 100 pages.93 
 
86.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, at 56350 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
240, 249b). 
87.  Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 
U. PA. L. REV. 613, 626 (1999); see also David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate 
Disclosure: Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 339 
(2011). 
88.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56351. 
89.  Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365, 56410 (Sept. 12, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249).  
90.  See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 627; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioural Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1533-37 (1988). 
91.  Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in 2013 (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492408#.U1ZpcPldWSp; Lynn, supra note 87, 
at 339; KPMG & FIN. EXECS. RES. FOUND., DISCLOSURE OVERLOAD AND COMPLEXITY: HIDDEN IN 
PLAIN SIGHT 2-3 (2011), 
http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/disclosure-overload-
complexity.pdf; Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial 
Disclosure Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S253, S268 (2014). 
92.  Sunstein, supra note 87, at 627-28. 
93.  DELOITTE, A NEW BEGINNING – ANNUAL REPORTS INSIGHTS 2013 21 (2013), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/about-deloitte/deloitte-uk-audit-a-new-
beginning-interactive.pdf. 
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The Chair of the SEC has even publicly questioned whether investors are being 
served “by the detailed and lengthy disclosures about all of the topics that 
companies currently provide in the reports they are required to prepare.”94 
Therefore, increasing the amount of disclosure obligations may be compounding 
already existing problems of information overload on investors. 
Thus, while social disclosure obligations can promote shareholders’ interests 
through informational efficiency and by providing them with the necessary tools 
for shareholder engagement, these benefits are only bestowed on shareholders 
when they are not outweighed by compliance costs and problems of 
informational overload. It is therefore debatable whether social disclosure 
obligations are benefitting shareholders. 
B. Society as Beneficiaries of Social Disclosure Requirements 
Because the utility of social disclosure obligations to shareholders is 
equivocal, governments may be designing these obligations for a wider class of 
beneficiaries than simply shareholders. India’s Securities and Exchange Board, 
for example, notes that social disclosure obligations are necessary to enable 
corporations—as “critical components of the social system”—to be accountable 
to the public at large.95 It goes on to observe that the need for accountability is 
underscored where corporations have accessed public funds, thereby adding a 
‘public interest’ element.96 Similarly, the Chinese government has introduced the 
concept of “building a harmonious society” as part of the governmental agenda 
and this concept now underscores corporate reporting obligations in the 
country.97 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange thus prefaces its social disclosure 
obligations by noting that these rules have been implemented for the purpose of 
“building social harmony” and “accelerating sustainable economic and social 
development.”98 According to these views, social disclosure obligations are 
clearly intended to benefit the public or society at large. 
The Indian and Chinese stock exchanges are not alone in using social 
disclosure obligations as a tool to benefit society generally. Some countries have 
introduced social disclosure obligations as a result of a growing awareness of 
“external responsibilities unfulfilled by governmental institutions” and a 
 
94.  Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#_ftnref7. 
95.  SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, supra note 50, at 1. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Jingchen Zhao, The Harmonious Society, Corporate Social Responsibility and Legal Responses 
to Ethical Norms in Chinese Company Law, 12 J. CORP. L. STUD. 163, 164 (2012); Geoffrey (Kok Heng) 
See, Harmonious Society and Chinese CSR: Is There Really a Link?, 89 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2009). 
98.  Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies (promulgated 
by the Shenzen Stock Exch., Sept. 25, 2006, effective Sept. 01, 2010), CLI.6.88455(EN) (Lawinfochina), 
art. 1. 
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recognition of the role of corporations in this arena.99 Other countries see these 
obligations as a tool to combat the global financial crisis.100 The US government 
has even been driven to impose social disclosure obligations on corporations for 
humanitarian reasons.101 
Several governments have confirmed that both shareholders and society are 
the beneficiaries of social disclosure obligations. The Indian national stock 
exchange observes that social disclosure obligations are required because 
corporations are accountable to both shareholders and to the larger society.102 
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange similarly notes that social disclosure obligations 
promote commitments to shareholders, employees, and communities among 
other stakeholders.103 
By contrast, the UK government has been more opaque in suggesting that 
social disclosure obligations benefit more than just shareholders. The 
government’s documents on social disclosure reporting state that these 
requirements are targeted at helping corporations provide information to 
investors, which they can use to be “active company owners.”104 In other words, 
the emphasis appears to be on using social disclosure requirements to further 
shareholder interests. However, in the government’s impact assessment report of 
the social disclosure requirements, it lists the beneficiaries of these rules as 
shareholders, corporations, NGOs, and “interested members of the public.”105 
Thus, the UK government seemingly intends social disclosure requirements to 
benefit public or societal interests alongside shareholder interests. 
C. Using Private Law to Further Public Aims 
Inserting social disclosure obligations into the private rubric of corporate and 
securities law is largely justifiable to the extent that it furthers the underlying 
goal of protecting shareholders’ private interests. Moreover, social disclosure 
 
99.  KPMG’S GLOB. SUSTAINABILITY SERVS. & UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CARROTS 
AND STICKS FOR STARTERS – CURRENT TRENDS AND APPROACHES IN VOLUNTARY AND MANDATORY 
STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 6 (2006), 
https://www.kpmg.com/GR/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Sustainability/Documents/Carrot
sandSticksStarters.pdf. 
100.  UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME ET AL., supra note 24, at 10. 
101.  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (“It is the sense of Congress that 
the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is . . . 
contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of 
the Securities Exchange Act . . . .”). 
102.  SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, supra note 50, at 1. 
103.  Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the Shenzen Stock Exch., Sept. 25, 2006, effective Sept. 01, 2010), CLI.6.88455(EN) 
(Lawinfochina). 
104.  BIS, supra note 5. 
105.  DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, NARRATIVE REPORTING 1 (Dec. 5, 2010), 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31404/11-1293-narrative-
reporting-impact-assessment.pdf. 
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obligations which further shareholders’ and societal interests are also largely 
justifiable in the private law realm as long as it does not contradict or diminish 
the protection of shareholders’ private interests. However, problems of 
justification arise in the use of corporate and securities law to further entirely 
public law issues, which do not have any bearing on the interests of 
shareholders.106 
Still, there is support for the enmeshment of public policy issues within the 
private rubric of corporate and securities law from two sources. The first involves 
the international legal duty of countries to protect their nationals’ rights, while 
the second stems from the need for governmental regulation to supplement the 
private ordering of corporate law. 
1. Duty to protect 
International human rights law imposes a duty on all countries to protect 
against human rights abuses, including abuses by business entities, within their 
jurisdiction.107 As part of this duty to protect, countries have positive obligations 
to prevent third party interference with the state’s nationals’ enjoyment of their 
rights, including private actors.108 From these obligations, John Ruggie, former 
UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, has developed an 
international framework that guides countries in fulfilling these obligations.109 
In his framework, Ruggie advocates that countries should support and 
strengthen market pressures on corporations to respect rights by using 
mechanisms such as sustainability reporting.110 He notes that corporations bear 
an independent duty to respect the rights of others which requires them to engage 
in due diligence. Due diligence entails corporations becoming aware of, 
preventing, and addressing adverse human rights impacts. Ruggie compares 
these obligations to systems that require corporations to manage financial and 
related risks.111 
 
106.  See, for example, the discussion on the problems with the Conflict Minerals Rule infra Section 
III.C. 
107.  John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Business and Human Rights: 
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, ¶ 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter BHR]; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Addendum – State 
Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities Under the United Nations Core Human 
Rights Treaties: An Overview of Treaty Body Commentaries, ¶¶ 7-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add.1 
(Feb.13, 2007) [hereinafter Addendum]. 
108.  John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Protect, Respect and Remedy: 
A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter 
Protect, Respect and Remedy]; see also BHR, supra note 107, ¶¶ 12–18; Addendum, supra note 107, ¶ 7. 
109.  See Protect, Respect and Remedy, supra note 108.  
110.  Id. ¶ 30. 
111.  Id. ¶¶ 55–56. 
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While Ruggie’s framework is not binding on countries, the international 
human rights legal instruments from which he derives his framework are.112 
Thus, countries party to the main international human rights treaties bear a duty 
under international law to protect their nationals’ rights and to prevent 
corporations from interfering with these rights. For example, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires states to protect 
individuals from having their Covenant rights violated by private entities while 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) requires states to take measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women by any enterprise.113 
Ruggie’s suggestions for international human rights obligations—such as 
requiring sustainability reporting or imposing due diligence standards on 
corporations—are comparable to social disclosure obligations. For example, 
both the ICCPR and the CEDAW mandate states to ensure equality between 
genders, 114 which  several countries meet directly by obliging corporations to 
disclose gender representation at senior levels of management.115 In this way, 
social disclosure obligations are justifiable as tools by which states can meet their 
international human rights obligations.116 
2.  Supporting Private Law 
A second source of support for enmeshing social issues within corporate law 
is the increasing recognition of the need for governmental regulation to support 
the private ordering of corporate law. In essence, the notion of private ordering 
is based on the view that a corporation is a “nexus of contracts,” a metaphor that 
represents the implicit and explicit voluntary contracts that affected parties will 
work out among themselves.117 Viewed in this manner, corporate law is seen as 
a set of default rules that represent the bargains corporate constituents would 
 
112.  These include, among others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
113.  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 
26, 2004); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 2(e) (1980) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
114.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 3, 172 U.N.T.S. 1976; 
CEDAW, supra note 113, at art. 2(3). 
115.  See, e.g., The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, 
SI 2013/1970, § 414C (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1970/pdfs/uksi_20131970_en.pdf; 
CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS, MULTILATERAL CSA NOTICE OF AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 
58-101 – DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 1 (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20141014_58-101_noa-national-
instrument.pdf. 
116.  John Ruggie’s report was generated under the auspices of the United Nations’ Human Rights 
Council. 
117.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 
1426 (1989). 
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have demanded had they determined the rules governing their relationship before 
the corporation was formed.118 Given the importance of private contracts to this 
view of the corporation, the focus for contractarians is on private ordering, 
making freedom of contract essential, and warranting a limited role for 
government intervention except in the enforcement of private contracts.119 
While the shortcomings of the contractarian view have been well-
documented,120 it continues to dominate corporate law theory, particularly in the 
United States.121 Still, even for advocates of contractarianism, who have 
traditionally eschewed governmental regulation in this arena, there is a growing 
recognition of the importance of governmental regulation in at least some areas 
of both corporate and securities law.122 
For example, governmental regulation in corporate law may be necessary to 
enable its private-order foundation to operate. In other words, from a 
contractarian perspective, regulations can lead to improved private contracts 
between parties.123 Thus, in instances of market failure, such as shareholders’ 
inability to accurately price governance rules124 or where there are opportunities 
for corporate managers to alter governance rules in their favor,125 governmental 
regulations can act as a guarantee to investors’ bargains with the corporation. 
These regulations also ensure the protection of standard form terms in corporate 
 
118.  See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577-78 (2003). 
119.  See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities 
Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 526 (1999). 
120.  For an overview of these shortcomings, see Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: 
Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631, 637-640 
(2009), and notes therein, and Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779 (2006). 
121.  See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117; STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
122.  See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1549 (1989); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1023 (2002); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117. For further discussion on the need for governmental 
regulation in corporate law, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1461 (1989), Lucian A. Bebchuk, Foreward, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989), MOORE, supra note 74, at 177, John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
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COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989). 
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Mandatory Corporate Governance: Structures Post-Sarbanes-Oxley, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229, 239 (2006) 
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charters, meaning that investors will be less likely to face divergent, and 
consequently uncertain, terms.126 
Without governmental regulation, private parties may not obtain optimal 
contracts. Where corporate managers fail to disclose certain information about a 
firm, including information which could be beneficial to competitor firms or 
could place their own jobs at peril, investors will not have sufficient information 
to conclude the best possible contract as they will not be knowledgeable about 
all available contracts.127 In this scenario, governmental regulation can act as a 
bond to corporate managers’ promise to disclose all material information, good 
and bad, thereby facilitating private ordering.128 
Governmental regulation may also be necessary to constrain corporate 
managers’ actions where their interests diverge from shareholder interests. 
Although contractarians argue that market forces will align the interests of 
corporate managers and shareholders, thereby making governmental regulation 
unnecessary,129 there are many instances in which market forces do not align 
divergent interests.130 In part, this is because the impact of market forces guiding 
corporate governance rules may be overstated. Studies have shown that a 
corporation’s corporate governance rules do not have a statistically significant 
effect on the price of its stock,131 and in any case, a corporation’s market value 
is dependent on a variety of factors beyond corporate governance rules.132 
Commentators have further argued that governmental regulation is necessary as 
the different market forces which could constrain corporate managers are 
imperfect or entirely ineffective for some issues.133 
Governmental intervention, in securities law particularly, may also be used 
to further society’s interest in having a more efficient market. As Coffee argues, 
regulations which require the disclosing of specific securities-related information 
may not improve the balance between purchasers and sellers of stocks, but it does 
 
126.  Gordon, supra note 122, at 1567-69.  
127.  Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 1436-38; Bainbridge, supra note 122, at 1033; see 
also Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of 
Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 732-39 (1999) (discussing the risks of nondisclosure of 
information prior to offerings). 
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of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 99, 108 (1989); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, 
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and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 579-81 (1990); Bebchuk, supra note 129, at 1460-67. 
131.  Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 1502. 
132.  MOORE, supra note 74, at 41. 
133.  Black, supra note 130, at 579; Bebchuk, supra note 129, at 1461-67. 
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“improve the allocative efficiency of the capital market,” and consequently, the 
productiveness of the economy.134 
Even under a private-ordering view of corporate law, governmental 
regulation is justifiable if it improves managerial accountability vis-à-vis 
shareholders or promotes the efficiency or productivity of the market. To some 
extent, social disclosure obligations satisfy both of these drivers of governmental 
interference. In terms of managerial accountability, mandatory social disclosure 
obligations can force corporate managers to disclose all social-related 
information and facilitate private ordering as well as help align the interests of 
managers and shareholders during instances of market failures. In addition, by 
requiring managers to produce otherwise under-produced information about 
corporate-related social issues, social disclosure obligations can drive the 
productivity of the market by propelling the allocative efficiency of the market. 
Moreover, to the extent that social disclosure obligations ex ante address 
negative externalities of corporate acts, for example by minimizing risk,135 the 
productivity and the efficiency of the market are also aided. As a result, there 
appears to be a role for governmental regulation in corporate and securities law 
relating to non-financial information. The scope of that role is less clear. 
III.  REGULATING SOCIAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS 
Having located a role for governmental intervention in corporate and 
securities law in relation to social issues, the next issue to examine is the nature 
and scope of that role. We have seen that mandatory disclosure rules can promote 
managerial accountability as well as promote the efficiency of the market. Thus, 
the role for governmental regulation relating to social disclosure obligations 
should focus on areas in which they will best promote these goals. 
In fact, commentators have argued that governmental regulation in corporate 
law is mainly acceptable as a supplemental or limited device.136 The 
supplemental or limited role for governmental intervention in this arena is further 
supported by the objectives of corporate law, which prioritizes shareholders’ 
(private) interests over other stakeholder interests137 and may privilege 
shareholder interests in instances of conflict.138 It follows, then, that the role for 
 
134.  Coffee, supra note 12, at 722. 
135.  For examples as to how social disclosure obligations minimize risk, see the discussion supra 
Section II.A. 
136.  Eisenberg, supra note 122; Bebchuk, supra note 129; Gordon, supra note 122; Coffee, supra 
note 122; Clark, supra note 122. Even Easterbrook & Fischel support governmental regulation in limited 
areas. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 117, at 1436-42. 
137.  See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 172, 419A (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. For a discussion on the 
prioritization of shareholder interests in UK corporate law, see generally ANDREW KEAY, THE 
CORPORATE OBJECTIVE (2011). 
138.  See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(holding that where breakup of a company is inevitable, the board’s duty changes from corporate entity 
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governmental regulation in corporate and securities law should be supplemental 
in nature; accordingly, its scope should be narrow and well-delineated. 
It is perhaps for this reason that countries have decided to rely on disclosure 
obligations as their preferred regulatory mechanism for promoting social aims in 
the context of business. Rather than prohibiting or controlling corporate conduct, 
social disclosure obligations allow a relatively light-handed approach to curbing 
corporate conduct in the context of social issues. 
Yet if the goal of government is to control corporate conduct on social issues, 
why do they rely on disclosure obligations rather than regulating the offending 
conduct? In other words, if governments want corporations to increase the 
number of women on boards or release less greenhouse gases, why do the 
regulations not focus on mandating female board representation or reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions instead of focusing on information about these issues? 
The answer appears to be a recognition of the limited role for government in 
corporate law and a preference for a meta-regulatory approach. 
A. Meta-Regulatory Approach 
Meta-regulation is a regulatory approach that induces corporations to identify 
and develop their own approaches to addressing problems.139 It enables reflexive 
thinking about regulation and focuses on regulating the process of regulation, 
rather than regulating the issues directly.140 The idea behind meta-regulation is 
that corporations, which possess superior information as to which internal rules 
and procedures are needed to address issues, should be encouraged to reorient 
their internal workings to address problems identified by the regulators. In this 
way, corporations possess ample flexibility to solve the problems they create.141 
One particular form of meta-regulation that appears to underscore the idea of 
social disclosure is reflexive law, which emerges in an attempt to draw together 
different aspects of society into different subsystems based on function.142 
Reflexive law is  a tool used to structure functionally differentiated semi-
autonomous social systems and whose aim is to shape these systems’ procedures 
 
preservation to maximizing company’s value for benefit of shareholders); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. 
v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 11 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that directors cannot use a corporate vehicle to solely 
pursue community service; they must promote the corporation’s value for the benefit of its stockholders). 
139.  Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 150 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge eds., 2010); 
CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 255 
(2002). 
140.  BRONWEN MORGAN, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF COMPETITION: THE 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF REGULATORY JUSTIFICATION 2 (2003). 
141.  Coglianese & Mendelson, supra note 139, at 149. 
142.  See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
239, 242-46 (1983) (developing the theory of “reflexive law” aimed to reconcile the internal dynamics of 
legal developments with the external constraints and necessities of post-modern society). 
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of internal discourse and their methods of coordination with other systems.143 
Because of this, reflexive law is primarily a procedural tool, one that is not 
responsible for substantive outcomes,144 and a method by which bargaining 
power between parties can be equalized.145 
The appeal of meta-regulatory approaches like reflexive law comes from 
using legal norms, procedures and sanctions to ‘frame’ or ‘steer’ the process of 
the corporation’s actions.146 They are designed to influence the processes of 
corporations, “to encourage thinking and behavior in the right direction,” and to 
cause corporations to reflect on and re-examine their own behavior.147 Meta-
regulatory approaches can prompt corporations to internalize social values which 
can then instigate changes to their behavior. Indeed, self-control as a necessary 
ingredient for social ordering is at the root of meta-regulatory approaches since 
it is not possible to create rules for every possible harm.148 
The underpinnings of a meta-regulatory approach are apparent in social 
disclosure obligations. Social disclosure obligations do not prescribe substantive 
outcomes; they focus on regulating the procedure by which information on these 
issues are disclosed. Furthermore, they work to help equalize bargaining power 
between corporations and those that transact with them by enabling shareholders, 
consumers, and employees to make informed decisions about whether—or to 
what extent—they want to transact with the corporation. More importantly, 
social disclosure obligations put the onus on corporations to self-reflect and to 
reexamine their behavior and encourage the internalization of social values. In 
doing so, social disclosure obligations are thought to norm correct bad corporate 
behavior. 
B. Limitations 
Despite a meta-regulatory approach providing a sound theoretical 
explanation for social disclosure obligations, it is unclear whether this approach 
to social disclosure obligations is, in and of itself, effective. To be sure, it does 
offer certain benefits. First, it circumvents problems of increased juridification 
as it prevents the need for governments to create new forms of regulation for 
 
143.  Id. at 255. 
144.  Id. at 254-55. 
145.  As Teubner writes, reflexive law “attempts to subject contracting parties to mechanisms of 
‘public responsibility’ that are designed to ensure that bargaining processes will take account of various 
externalities.” Id. at 256. 
146.  Catherine Barnard et al., Reflexive Law, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Evolution of 
Labour Standards: The Case of Working Time 4 (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, 
Working Paper No. 294, 2004). 
147.  Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1264 (1995); David Hess, 
Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 
41, 48-51 (1999); David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through 
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 353, 370 (2005).  
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every aspect of corporate behavior that affects society.149 It also enables a 
proactive form of regulation rather than a reactive one. With regulation, there is 
generally a time difference between when the problem in need of regulation is 
identified and when the regulation is identified—a time difference that does not 
arise with disclosure obligations.150 Third, it allows governments to better 
understand new social problems, which may be crucial to the eventual 
introduction of more substantive regulation.151 Fourth, it enables corporations to 
innovate solutions to problems, rather than merely to adhere to minimum levels 
of behavior, by offering them the flexibility to determine how they will meet 
their social disclosure obligations, enabling them to adopt firm-specific 
strategies. Finally, it can replace more complex regulation and act as a public 
monitoring device that, in some instances, can spur desirable outcomes.152 
Nevertheless, due to the overriding interest in using social disclosure obligations 
to change corporate behavior, there are concerns about the effectiveness of meta-
regulation.153 Mainly, it is unclear as to whether social disclosure can actually 
change corporate behavior. 
In fact, research on the utility of social disclosure obligations has been 
inconclusive. The only large-scale study of mandatory sustainability reporting 
found that disclosure obligations increase corporate priorities for employee 
training and implementation of ethical practices.154 Another study, surveying 540 
firms, found that the process of drafting a sustainability report is the most 
important catalyst for businesses for organizational change and establishing 
suitable structures and practices.155 In the case of disclosure obligations related 
to toxic chemicals, limited empirical research has demonstrated that these 
obligations can improve firms’ environmental performance.156 
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However, studies have not consistently found the effects of mandatory social 
disclosure obligations on corporate behavior to be positive. For instance, the 
same large-scale study that found positive effects of mandatory sustainability 
reporting on some aspects of corporate behavior failed to find “a statistically 
reliable effect of mandatory disclosure on the prioritization of sustainable 
development by firms.”157 Similarly, another study found that while reporting on 
environmental and social issues may increase corporate management’s 
awareness of these issues, it does not lead to corporate management questioning 
their practices in this area.158 A Spanish study found similar results, concluding 
that reporting on environmental issues did not lead to significant organizational 
changes in firms.159 One study even emphasized the need to introduce 
governmental regulations—and not voluntary corporate social responsibility 
policies—in order to effect significant changes in corporate behavior in the oil 
industry.160 Disclosing social issues may not, therefore, necessarily result in 
changes to corporate behavior. 
The reasons for the failure of mandatory social disclosure requirements to 
affect corporate behavior are myriad. One possibility may be because 
corporations are either failing to comply with these obligations, or they are doing 
so in a “tick-the-box” method without embracing their “spirit.”161 For instance, 
in relation to disclosure obligations relating to diversity in corporations, 
compliance has been found to be haphazard.162 Climate change disclosure in the 
United States has been similarly found to be problematic, with a recent study 
reporting that most climate change disclosures “are very brief, provide little 
discussion of material issues, and do not quantify impacts or risks.”163 
Comparatively, in the UK, corporations have been more diligent about providing 
extensive commentary relating to disclosure obligations on environmental and 
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employee matters, but around 20 percent of corporations continue to provide 
only brief or generic information on these issues.164 
Additionally, commentators have raised concerns that corporate managers 
are disclosing information showing the corporation only in a favorable light.165 
In an effort to manage impressions, corporate managers may manipulate 
stakeholders’ impressions of a corporation’s social and environmental 
performance or disclose information selectively in order to preserve 
organizational legitimacy.166 Even where negative information is disclosed, the 
information can be marginalized or abstracted in such a way that its focus is on 
altering stakeholders’ perceptions rather than changing corporate behavior.167 
Corporate managers may thus be using disclosure obligations only to emphasize 
the positive and as a “public relations tool rather than as an opportunity for 
candid performance analysis.”168 Moreover, since the aim of these obligations is 
to equalize bargaining powers between corporations and stakeholders, 
information that is generic, incomplete, or overly optimistic undercuts the ability 
for stakeholders to transact with the corporate on a level playing field. 
C. Reconfiguring Social Disclosure Obligations 
A meta-regulatory approach to social disclosure obligations in corporate and 
securities law may not, consequently, be achieving its aims. Both its ability to 
correct corporate managers’ behavior and its ability to equalize bargaining 
between corporations and stakeholders are likely not consistently being met. 
However, as it does offer a number of benefits, it should not be overlooked as a 
regulatory strategy. Still, the role of social disclosure obligations should 
nonetheless be primarily supplemental. 
Confining social disclosure obligations to a supplemental role ensures it 
cannot be viewed by governments as a panacea to correct corporate-related social 
ills. Since evidence of their effectiveness is equivocal, it seems likely that if they 
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are correcting corporate behavior, they are doing so only in an incremental 
manner. As a result, regulation of corporate interactions with social issues, such 
as human rights and the environment, requires the implementation of additional 
regulatory strategies—besides just disclosure obligations—to ensure the respect 
and protection of these issues.169 
Moreover, as a supplemental regulatory strategy, social disclosure 
obligations in corporate and securities law should occupy a well-defined and 
delineated space. They should not be overly broad, should bear a relationship to 
corporate objectives, and should be specific. This reflects both their origins as 
primarily a private law device with a supplemental public law role170 and as a 
regulatory strategy which cannot, in and of itself, correct corporate-related social 
ills. 
1. Limited and Related Scope 
Since social disclosure obligations in corporate and securities law should 
only be given a supplemental role, they must be drafted carefully to prevent them 
from being overly broad. As a way of limiting the scope of the obligation, there 
should be a reasonable and proximate relationship between the social issue 
requiring disclosure and corporate objectives. 
Under U.S. securities law, “materiality” defines the scope of the required 
disclosure of information, which requires issuers to disclose information “if there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important” 
or it “alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”171 Moreover, 
corporate objectives for U.S. corporations are mainly directed at maximizing 
shareholder profit.172 Thus, social disclosure obligations should require the 
disclosure of social policy information that is both material and bears a 
reasonable and proximate relationship to furthering shareholder profit. 
Applying these standards to the Conflict Mineral Rule, it becomes apparent 
that the Rule’s materiality is questionable and it fails to conform to the need for 
a reasonable and proximate relationship to shareholder profit. In terms of 
materiality, investors’ interests in having corporations disclose information about 
conflict mineral usage appears to be mixed. In support of the Conflict Minerals 
Rule, investors representing just under $200 billion in assets, signed a letter 
supporting the disclosure of conflict mineral information.173 However, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
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Business Roundtable, apparently representing industry and investor interests, 
brought an action to have the Rule nullified.174 Therefore, while some investors 
believe the Rule elicits important information, others do not. It is thus unclear 
whether the ‘reasonable’ investor considers information pertaining to the use of 
conflict minerals as material. 
The importance of whether a corporation’s use of conflict minerals is 
material to investors is particularly cogent since the Conflict Minerals Rule does 
not have a de minimis threshold.175 As a result, even minimal use of a conflict 
mineral must be disclosed if it is “necessary to the functionality or production of 
that product.”176 Thus, currently any instance in which a conflict mineral, which 
is necessary to the functionality or production of a manufactured product, is used 
– no matter how small or whether investors are interested in this information – 
must be disclosed, further complicating the materiality threshold. 
At the same time, the Conflict Minerals Rule fails to bear a reasonable and 
proximate relationship to furthering shareholder profit. Instead, as the SEC has 
noted, legislators introduced the Conflict Minerals Rule primarily for 
humanitarian reasons.177 While commentators recognize that securities laws can 
serve the public interest,178 the public interest goals should be clearly related to 
the underlying goals of the legislation itself.179 Thus, regulation prohibiting 
fraudulent disclosures serves the public interest by preserving the integrity of the 
public market, but it also fosters investor protection, one of the goals of securities 
legislation. Conversely, the Conflict Minerals Rule mandating disclosure on a 
corporation’s supplier chains in the DRC serves the public interest by preventing 
conflict in another country, but without any identifiable relationship to the goals 
of securities legislation.180 
The effects of the Conflict Mineral Rule highlight the problems with using 
corporate and securities law to regulate issues that clearly lie beyond their 
purview.. While the Rule has brought a renewed awareness of the conflict in the 
DRC, it has also caused market distortions to the detriment of the local 
 
174.  See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
175.  Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56295 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
240, 249b). 
176.  Id. at 56364. 
177.  Id. at 56275 (noting the Rule was introduced for humanitarian reasons). 
178.  See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1999). 
179.  As the SEC has noted, its discretion to promulgate disclosure requirements is dependent on 
whether it believes that the information would be necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors 
or the furtherance of fair, orderly and informed securities markets or for fair opportunity for corporate 
suffrage. See Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 
5627, 8 SEC Docket 73 (Oct. 14, 1975).  
180.  This is because it is unclear whether the Conflict Minerals Rule fosters investor protection. See 
Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’rs, SEC, Joint Statement on the Conflict Minerals 
Decision (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1370541665582#.VRLBro6sUfE; Nat’l Ass’n 
of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
214  BERKELEY BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:1 
 
population. Corporations pulled out of the region altogether, resulting in armed 
groups seeking alternative sources of funding and causing the conflict mineral 
smuggling chain to be re-routed rather than stopped.181 Indeed, as a political 
problem, using corporate and securities law to address the issues in the DRC may 
have exacerbated problems for the Congolese rather than alleviate them. It could 
have also provided the impression that the problem is being “handled,” thereby 
discouraging further attempts at resolving it.182 
Limiting the scope of social disclosure obligations may alleviate some of the 
problems caused by the Conflict Minerals Rule. For example, in the UK, the 
requirement for corporations to disclose information on human rights violations 
is limited “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, 
performance or position of the company’s business.”183 The use of the words “to 
the extent necessary” creates a natural de minimis threshold, noticeably absent in 
the Conflict Mineral Rule.  This allows corporations to disclose only the amount 
of information that is relevant to the corporation’s development, performance or 
position, rather than every piece of human rights information. Not only does this 
reduce the amount of information the corporation must produce—saving the 
corporation money and time which could be better used on other activities—but 
it also allows the corporation to focus on the human rights issues that are the 
most pertinent to the functioning of the business. 
A more limited scope for social disclosure obligations exists where those 
obligations have a closer relationship to the underlying goals of securities or 
corporate law. For example, disclosure obligations relating to greenhouse gas 
emissions,184 a corporation’s CSR practices,185 employment practices,186 and 
climate change impact actions187 are much closer related to the underlying goals 
of corporate or securities law than the Conflict Mineral Rule because they focus 
 
181.  The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals Provision Before the 
Subcomm. on Monetary Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 130th Cong. 3-6 (2013); Laura 
E. Seay, What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? – Conflict Minerals, Civilian Livelihoods, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy (Ctr. for Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 284, 2012). 
182.  Representative Huizenga questioned whether passage of this law could lead to a sense of: 
“Okay, we are done. We passed Section 1502. It is now being implemented. Whew. Good. That is off the 
table. Now we can walk away?” The Unintended Consequences of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals 
Provision, Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Policy & Trade of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 130th Cong. 
31 (2013) (statement of Rep. Huizenga, Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
183.  Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 414C(4), (7) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. See also Directive 
2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of 
certain types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, art. I, 2003 
O.J. (L 178), for the EU Modernisation Directive, from which the UK legislation derives. 
184.  See, for example, supra notes 36, 46, 57, for the requirements in France, the UK, and the United 
States 
185.  See, for example, supra notes 37, 49, for the requirements in Denmark and India. 
186.  See, for example, supra notes 43-44, for the requirements in UK. 
187.  See, for example, supra note 38, for the requirements in Denmark. 
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on issues of clear and well-evidenced188 interest to corporate stakeholders, 
including shareholders. 
2. Specificity 
In addition to ensuring that social disclosure obligations are limited in their 
ambit and relate to corporate objectives, these obligations should be drafted in a 
manner that elicits specific rather than generic answers. For instance, disclosure 
obligations that require corporations to disclose information on their employees 
or their community can be easily responded to by generic answers, given that 
they do not provide any guidance on the nature of the information they seek.189 
Moreover, even if the corporation provides information on these issues, it may 
not be information that is meaningful or that meets the spirit of the obligations. 
For example, one corporation, in relation to its disclosure obligations relating to 
community issues, listed its tax payments as a contribution to the community.190 
Legislators should thus draft disclosure obligations with a degree of 
specificity. This can be accomplished in a number of ways. One approach would 
be to break down the disclosure obligation into subcategories. For example, 
disclosure obligations under French law require corporations—under the heading 
of employment information—to disclose information about: the total number and 
distribution of employees by gender, age and geographical area; hiring and 
firing; remuneration and its evolution; collective bargaining agreements; health 
and safety conditions; and descriptions of training policies.191 Further 
subcategories of employment information could also include information on 
wages, parental leave programs, employee lawsuits and policies on work-life 
balance. As with employment information, other social disclosure obligations 
could similarly be broken down into subcategories in an effort to solicit more 
detailed information relating to each category. 
A second approach would be to rely more on quantifiable data relating to 
social issues, rather than only narrative data. Standardization of disclosed 
information may prove successful in changing corporate behavior under 
disclosure rules relating to toxic chemicals. Standardization allows for 
 
188.  See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 6290, 6291 (Feb. 8, 2010) (discussing the impact of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change 
evidence on reporting companies). 
189.  See, e.g., Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 417(5) (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/section/417 (requiring certain disclosure to include “to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or position of the company’s 
business . . . information about . . . the company’s employees”). 
190.  VEDANTA RES., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2013 17 (2013), 
http://www.vedantaresources.com/media/126374/vedantafy2013ar.pdf. 
191.  Décret 2012-557 du 24 Avril 2012 relatif aux obligations de transparence des entreprises en 
matière sociale et environnementale [Decree 2012-557 of April 24, 2012 Concerning Corporate 
Transparency Requirements Relating to Social and Environmental Matters], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA 
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 26, 2012, art. 1. 
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comparison of data and benchmarking across corporations, and corporate 
managers can therefore easily measure their performance leading to an 
understanding of the issue early on. Commentators argue that this ability to 
confront reality as well as the ability to compare information with competitors 
has prompted changes in corporate behavior.192 
Currently, social disclosure obligations mainly focus on narrative 
information, meaning that the information is more difficult to standardize and 
does not easily enable comparisons or benchmarking. There is, however, 
quantifiable information relating to social issues. For example, in terms of 
environmental issues, greenhouse gas emissions, carbon emissions, and energy 
consumption, are all quantifiable. Similarly, for employee issues, the average 
number of training hours per employee provided, the retention rate, the 
percentage of employee injuries or fatalities and the remuneration ratio of women 
to men for each employee are also quantifiable. Even for human rights, certain 
information is quantifiable including the number of employee training hours on 
human rights policies, the number and percentage of operations that have been 
subject to human rights reviews or impact assessments, the number of significant 
contracts that have undergone human rights screening, and the number of human 
rights grievances that have been filed and resolved through formal grievance 
mechanisms. While these quantifiable areas of the social issues need not replace 
narrative data, which may be necessary to flesh out the details of the quantifiable 
data or for areas which cannot be measured through numbers, they are more 
likely to elicit data which can be more easily measured, standardized and used to 
benchmark progress. 
Using subcategories of social issues or relying more heavily on quantifiable 
social information helps corporations focus the information they are disclosing. 
By responding to specific inquiries, corporations are guided along the elements 
of the broadly-worded category and no longer have to self-determine what 
information on these issues they have to disclose. This deters the provision of 
generic answers. 
Finally, a third approach—which could be used independently or in 
conjunction with one or both of the two earlier approaches—would be to provide 
informational guidance to corporations on completing social disclosure 
obligations. The SEC has previously employed this approach by providing 
interpretive guidance to corporations in completing their disclosure obligations 
relating to climate change and cybersecurity issues.193 Several organizations in 
the UK have also provided similar forms of guidance.194 Professional services 
 
192.  See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 156, at 295; Lowenstein, supra note 15, at 1342-45. 
193.  Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 
(Feb. 8, 2010); Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 – 
Cybersecurity (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
194.  See, e.g., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., REPORTING STATEMENT: OPERATING AND 
FINANCIAL REVIEW (2006), https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/ASB/Reporting-Statement-
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firm Deloitte has even provided samples of how corporations can properly adhere 
to their disclosure obligations, including in the context of social issues.195 
Informational guidance on where corporations may encounter human rights, 
environmental or other social policy issues; in what business context this 
information could become apparent, how this information could be material to 
investors, and how to incorporate these issues into pre-existing reporting 
requirements could be provided as a persuasive, but non-binding tool to assist 
corporations in completing disclosure requirements. By doing so, corporations 
could draw from professional guidelines to help make their disclosure more 
specific and thus more meaningful. 
CONCLUSION 
While likely not a panacea for curing corporate ills, there is value in using 
social disclosure requirements to promote social aims in the corporate context. 
These types of requirements may force corporations to acknowledge – perhaps 
for the first time – certain social policy issues within the business environment. 
This acknowledgement can lead corporate managers to incorporate social 
considerations into corporate decision-making with the potential effect of 
curbing corporate misconduct. The transparency provided by social disclosure 
requirements may also provide a platform for shareholders or other stakeholders 
to engage with corporations on these issues. 
Nevertheless, by focusing on regulating informational disclosure of 
particular social policy issues rather than directly regulating the issues 
themselves, governments risk the possibility of not having any effect on social 
policy issues in the corporate context. In fact, social disclosure obligations do 
not offer any guarantees. Reliance on social disclosure obligations, exclusively 
or even primarily, as a regulatory strategy therefore carries potentially severe 
risks. 
Social disclosure obligations are imperfect substitutes for direct regulation of 
corporate conduct on social policy issues. They do, however, offer promise as a 
complementary regulatory strategy. But as complements, their supplemental role 
should be underlined by ensuring that social disclosure obligations are limited in 
their ambit, are specific and relate to the legislative goals and objectives of 
corporate and securities laws. 
 
Operating-and-Financial-Review-File.pdf; INT’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., IFRS PRACTICE 
STATEMENT MANAGEMENT COMMENTARY – A FRAMEWORK FOR PRESENTATION (2010), 
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Management-Commentary/IFRS-Practice-
Statement/Documents/Managementcommentarypracticestatement8December.pdf; INT’L INTEGRATED 
REPORTING COUNCIL, CONSULTATION DRAFT OF THE INTERNATIONAL <IR> FRAMEWORK (2013), 
http://integratedreporting.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Consultation-Draft-of-the-
InternationalIRFramework.pdf. 
195.  See generally DELOITTE, supra note 93. 
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While the search for the optimal basket of regulatory tools to ensure 
corporate alignment with social policy issues continues, social disclosure 
obligations offer a good—but far from perfect—alternative to traditional 
regulatory options. Their success, however, will only be realized by recognizing 
their limitations. 
 
